
































































































DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN  





The Australian Centre on China in the World 






University of Western Australia and 
College of Business and Economics 







China, India, demographic change, and economic growth 
 
JEL codes: 




DISCUSSION PAPER 11.04 
 
ABSTRACT: 
The timing of China’s and India’s demographic transitions and the implications of alternative 
fertility scenarios are here explored using a global economic model incorporating full 
demographic behavior and measures of dependency that include the working aged and those 
of working age who do not work.  The results show that, while the path of total dependency 
in China will be comparatively flat, the positive contribution of declining youth dependency 
to real per capita income will not be offset by rising aged dependency until beyond 2030. 
India’s dependency ratio declines more sharply. Its higher initial fertility contributes 
positively to growth in GDP while weakening that in its real per capita income.  Yet, so long 
as fertility continues to decline the latter negative effect will be partially offset by a 
demographic dividend worth at least five per cent of its 2000 real per capita income over 
more than three decades.  
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China’s exceptional economic growth and development during the last fifty years has been 
accompanied by equally remarkable demographic change.  Rapid drops in mortality and 
fertility rates ushered in the most rapid “demographic transition” experienced at anytime 
anywhere in world history.  The demographic transition to slower population growth has been 
profoundly affected by China’s family planning policies, culminating in the one-child policy.  
Yet fertility rates would have declined anyway, affected as they have been in China’s Asian 
neighbours by urbanisation, female education, increases in labour force participation rates, 
improved life-expectancy of new-born children, high parental costs of a competitive 
education system and a myriad of other socio-economic factors.  Indeed, India’s fertility rates 
have also declined steadily since the 1970s.  However, the relatively slow speed of this 
decline has been among the factors that have delayed India’s demographic transition, 
particularly when contrasted with China’s. 
There is now plenty of evidence to suggest that the potential “dividend”, “gift” or 
“bonus” associated with the middle phase of the demographic transition, during which 
dependency ratios fall and the proportion of the working-age population rises, can be quite 
substantial.  Bloom and Williamson (1998) reassess the East Asia “miracle” in this context 
and, noting the rapid growth of working-age populations across the region between 1965 and 
1990, they show that population dynamics could account for as much as one half of the 
region’s growth performance during this period.  Cai and Wang (2005) claim that about one-
quarter of China’s per capita GDP growth during the period 1980-2003 can be attributed to 
its demographic dividend, which they predict will be exhausted by the year 2015.  Similarly, 
Feng and Mason (2005) argue that the gains from China’s dividend (accounting for 15 per 
cent of growth between 1982 and 2000) have mostly been reaped, although they do also note 
the persistence of these gains – amounting to 10 per cent higher per capita output in 2050 
compared with 1982. Crucially, the demographic dividend is not an automatic consequence 
of fertility decline, but instead depends “on many policies, institutions and conditions that 
determine an economy’s capacity to equip its people with human and physical capital and to 
absorb them into productive employment” (Bloom et al., 2000: 259).  For India, with its 
slower and later demographic transition, much of the potential demographic dividend lies 
ahead.  For both China and India, the timing and duration of their respective dividends are 
still very much open to question.   2 
 
Most of the related empirical research defines demographic dividends as stemming 
from declines in dependency ratios, which are in turn defined as the proportion of populations 
that are of working-age (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Bloom and Canning, 2005a, 2007; 
Bloom et al., 2002; Bloom, et al., 2000; and Cai and Wang, 2005).  Yet, in most countries 
there are substantial groups of “working age” people who do not work, and there are people 
older than “working age” who do work.  A more precise measure of the dependency ratio is 
the quotient of the non-working and the working populations, and this may differ 
substantially from the standard measure.  Taking this into account we show that China’s 
demographic dividend since the turn of the century will remain positive, if small, beyond 
2030, even though total dependency there will begin to rise before then.  Put another way, the 
contribution of age distribution changes since 2000 to the level of China’s real per capita 
income will remain net positive throughout this period. 
This finding does not detract from the fact that China’s population is aging, which has 
rightly become a major policy concern in recent years.  The proportion of China’s aged (60+) 
population is expected to almost double from 12 per cent in 2010 to 23 per cent in 2030, so 
that rises in aged dependency will begin to outstrip falls in youth dependency in this period.  
In contrast, India’s aged population will increase from 7 to just 12 per cent over the same 
period – overall dependency will continue to be dominated by declines in youth dependency, 
foreshadowing a more substantial demographic dividend.  Not surprisingly, these different 
population structures have elicited different population policy responses, with China now 
actively discussing (but not moving to) a “two- child policy” (Xinhuanet, 2005, Reuters, 
2010), while India continues to grapple with ways to promote fertility decline (Matthews et 
al., 2009). 
In this paper, the linkages between demographic change and economic growth in 
China and India are explored using a global economic model in which regional households 
are disaggregated by age and gender and which incorporates full demographic behavior.  This 
composite model provides a means to examine, quantitatively and at a high level of 
disaggregation, the interactions between demographic change and economic performance.   
The results confirm that there are significant potential gains to future real per capita income 
from India’s demographic dividend, whereas for China, these gains are largely in the past.  
Although higher fertility rates and hence more rapid population growth in China might 
ultimately ease some of the burden of an aging population and contribute to higher rates of 
growth in GDP, it will be contradictory to the goal of delivering improvements in real per 3 
 
capita income.  For India, the benefits of reduced fertility, in terms of real per capita income, 
are shown to be substantial. 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the various links between 
demographic transition and economic growth in the context of China and India.  In Section 4 
the composite model is described and the baseline scenario for the global economy through to 
2030 is presented.  An alternative “constant population structure” scenario is then introduced 
to isolate the demographic dividends to be enjoyed by the two countries in the future.   
Section 5 presents the simulated results of two alternative fertility scenarios: one in which 
China’s fertility rates are higher than currently projected, and the other in which India’s are 
lower. Conclusions are offered in Section 6. 
 
2.  Fertility decline and demographic transition 
Coale and Hoover’s (1958) seminal book provides a detailed depiction of how economic 
development precipitates a country’s demographic transition from high to low mortality and 
fertility.  During the first phase, mortality rates – and particularly those of infants and young 
children – decline substantially due to the effects of economic development on poverty 
reduction and improvements in food supply, technology, transport and health. This triggers a 
decline in birth rates in the middle phase, which is compounded by rising costs of child 
rearing and also to higher opportunity costs of foregoing work opportunities outside the 
home. Rises in private consumption, female education and life expectancy, along with the 
affordability and availability of birth control measures, are among the other factors 
contributing to fertility decline.  During the final phase of the transition, further but less 
marked fertility declines – as parents shift towards “quality not quantity” of children 
(Demeny and McNicoll, 2006) – are accompanied by fairly steady or slowly declining 
mortality rates, the latter occurring especially among the elderly population (Bloom et al., 
2000).  The pace of the transition will vary from country to country, impacted not only by the 
speed of economic development – and hence the wide range of reforms and policies that 
shape that development – but also by cultural factors as well as population and family 
planning policies.   
Figure 1 depicts the crude birth rates and death rates for China and India between 
1950 and 2010.  China’s transition began in the early 1950s, with the death rate falling 4 
 
dramatically from 25 (per 1000) in 1950 to 11 in 1965.
1  Infant mortality improved 
dramatically during this time, while birth rates remained high until 1965.
2  This year roughly 
identifies the beginning of the middle phase of China’s transition with the birth rate falling 
steadily from 37 (per 1000) in 1965 to 22 in 1980, by which time the death rate had fallen to 
7.3.  During the final phase since 1980, the birth rate continued to fall while the death rates 
changed only slightly, ranging between 6.6 and 7.5 during the period 1980 to 2010.  As the 
figure shows, from nearly identical birth and death rates in 1950, China recorded a more 
rapid decline in its death rate followed by a more rapid decline in its birth rate, resulting in a 
more compressed and earlier transition than India.  The slow and steady pace of India’s 
transition makes it more difficult to clearly identify the three phases described above, 
although they can roughly be identified as 1950-75 (during which time the death rate halved), 
1975-2000 (during which time the birth rate fell from 36 to 25) and 2000 onwards. 
Coale and Hoover’s (1958) most lasting contribution has not been on how economic 
development precipitates demographic transition, but rather on the subsequent impacts of 
demographic transition on economic growth. Declining mortality rates concentrated among 
infants and young children combined with high fertility rates initially create high levels of 
youth dependency, which impedes economic growth. While high fertility rates have a 
concurrent negative impact on growth, some two decades later, in the middle phase of 
transition, the proportion of working-age people in the population rises substantially, giving 
rise to the potential for a “demographic dividend”.   
With this analysis, Coale and Hoover essentially joined the Malthusian club of 
“population pessimists” in asserting that fertility reductions, and hence lower population 
growth, would be good for economic development (or in other words, that rapid population 
growth was a bad thing) (Bloom and Williamson, 1998).  In contrast, “population optimists” 
contend that rapid population growth allows countries to benefit from economies of scale and 
promotes the adoption of institutional and technological innovation (e.g. Boserup, 1965) or, 
in the case of Mao Zedong, that command planning would eliminate the Malthusian-type 
problems of rapidly growing populations (Sharping, 2003).  And then the “neutralists” argue 
that there is no relationship between the rate of population growth and economic 
                                                 
1  The use of five-yearly data smooths over the “demographic disaster” during Mao’s Great Leap Forward, 
which according to the National Bureau of Statistics (2000), resulted in death rates peaking at 25 in 1960. 
However, they recovered soon thereafter, and had fallen to 9.5 in 1965.   
2 Infant mortality fell from 195 (per 1000) births in 1950-55 to 121 in 1960-65 (United Nations, 2008).  As seen 
in the figure, the Great Leap Forward had a strong impact on birth rates as well.  According to the National 
Bureau of Statistics (2000), these fell to a low of 18 in 1961 and then peaked at 43 in 1963.   5 
 
development.  While there is some evidence in support of the optimists and neutralists,
3 the 
recent surge of econometric evidence stemming from Bloom and Williamson (1998) provides 
substantial evidence in support of the pessimist stance, and it is this stance that we capture in 
the modelling framework below. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the changing age structure of the Chinese and Indian 
populations during the period 1950-2030, using United Nations (2008) data for the youth 
(aged 0-14), working-aged (15-59) and aged (60+) populations. There are numerous points of 
interest to our analysis here.  First, the speed and compression of China’s demographic 
transition relative to India’s is quite visible in Figure 2, which shows the rapid decline in 
China’s youth dependency through to 2010 and the commencement of rapid aging since then. 
This combination implies that China’s total dependency ratio (defined here simply as the sum 
of youth and aged dependency) declined through to 2010 and is increasing thereafter, or 
equivalently, that the proportion of its working-age population increased through to 2010 and 
is decreasing thereafter, as shown in Figure 3.  In contrast, India’s demographic transition is 
visibly much slower, with its total dependency ratio falling throughout the period 1970-2030.  
This means that the peak of India’s working age–non-working age ratio in 2035 is 25 years 
behind China’s in 2010. This implies that China’s demographic dividend should essentially 
come to an end in 2010, although we argue below that this is not actually the case.   
It is clear from the above discussion that many different factors impact on the timing, 
speed and duration of each country’s transition. However, none do so more obviously than 
fertility. Indeed, Coale and Hoover’s (1958: 335) final sentence presents a clear-cut case for 
fertility reductions: “At any stage in the foreseeable future of the low-income countries with 
high fertility, a reduction in fertility would produce important economic advantages.  Since 
these advantages are cumulative, the ultimate benefits of fertility reduction are greater, the 
sooner it occurs”.  It was this line of thinking that invoked the idea of a “population problem” 
and the need for population control as a means of promoting economic development in many 
developing countries, including China, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, Egypt and Chile, all of which implemented a range of family planning policies from 
the 1950s onwards (Caldwell and Zhao, 2006). 
                                                 
3 For example, the neutralists find support in cross-country regressions of economic growth, which have 
generally found population growth rates to be insignificant (Kelley and Schmidt, 1996).  Lal (2006) finds some 
support for Boserup’s view in the positive relationship between population growth and agricultural growth in the 
Indian economy and uses this to assert that the “population problem” is no longer a problem in India.  This is 
certainly not the “consensus view” that he claims it to be. 6 
 
While China’s and India’s family planning policies have clearly differed in style and 
impact, both countries have a long history of trying to control their expanding populations.
4    
China’s controversial one-child policy has undoubtedly reduced fertility rates beyond what 
they would otherwise have been. Sharping (2003) controls for numerous other factors that 
affect population growth – including urbanisation, female education, increases in labour force 
participation and improved life expectancy, all of which would have contributed to declining 
fertility in China, regardless of its population policy – and estimates that, in the absence of 
the state’s birth control policies, China’s population would have been 1.6 billion instead of 
the 1.27 billion reported at the end of the 20
th century, that is, causing a reduction of some 
330 million births.  Other demographers have estimated the number of births averted by the 
one-child policy at around 250 million (Lee and Liang, 2006; Xie, 2000), while the National 
Family Planning and Population Commission of China puts the figure at 400 million.
5 
In September 2010, China “marked the anniversary of its controversial one-child 
policy with talk of relaxing rules, at least in some provinces” (Reuters, 2010). Although the 
official line still remains that China will continue to “coordinate its national family planning 
policy, stabilizing an appropriately low birth rate and improving the quality of its 
population”
6, the government is certainly prepared to consider the implications of higher 
fertility rates, as indicated by research conducted by the Development Research Centre of the 
State Council of China (2000), which projects China’s population under a variety of fertility 
scenarios including a “two-child policy”.   
Since the early 1950s, family planning in India has focused on sterilization-based 
methods, initially directed toward males but with female sterilization later emerging as the 
predominant method (Matthews et al., 2009, Padmadas et al. 2005).  Despite fairly rapid 
declines in the late 1990s in some southern states, Matthews et al. (2009) show that, overall, 
India has experienced a slow but steady decline in fertility rates, with some stagnation in 
recent years.  In their analysis they consider the potential impact on population growth if 
India were to shift away from its focus on sterilization and towards something more akin to 
China’s “fewer, later, longer” policy (adopted there in the 1970s) as a way of achieving more 
significant fertility decline in the future.
7   Their population projections suggest that such a 
                                                 
4 For further details on China’s population policies, see Sharping (2003), Zhang and Cao (2006) and Liang and 
Lee (2006), among an extensive list.  Matthews et al. (2009) provide excellent details of India’s population 
policies, while Padmadas et al. (2005) covers both countries.  See Tyers, Golley and Bain (2009) for a brief 
summary.   
5 See http://www.npc.gov.cn/pc/11_4/2011-03/10/content_1640532.htm, downloaded on 4 April, 2011. 
6 Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang, cited in the The China Daily (2010a).  
7 “Later, longer, fewer” refers to later marriage, longer gaps between children and fewer births in total. 7 
 
policy could reduce India’s population by 52 million in 2050 compared with the current 
fertility trajectory. 
As China enters a period of rapid aging and contemplates relaxing its one-child policy 
even further, and India continues to seek more effective fertility-reduction policies, it is worth 
considering the impact such policy choices will have on each country’s population structure 
and hence economic performance.  According to Padmadas et al. (2005), fertility rates are the 
main driving force of population change (in absolute terms) in both China and India, but also 
the most uncertain.
8  The uncertain link between policies and outcomes is just one of the 
reasons why fertility projections vary widely.  The “high fertility” variant of the United 
Nations (2008) population projections, for example, implies that India’s total fertility rate will 
fall to 2.46 in 2025–2030, while according to Dyson’s (2002) “low fertility” variant it will 
reach 1.59 by that time.  Regardless of which of these projections turn out to be correct, the 
key point is this: demographic transitions are not deterministic, but are instead shaped by a 
range of factors that impact on population structure, of which fertility rates are just one.  
 
3. Demographic  transition and economic growth 
While population projections are certainly complex, the resulting economic impact of the 
demographic transition is even more so.  The standard Solow-Swan model of growth is 
essentially a population pessimistic one, with the assumptions of diminishing factor returns 
and constant labor participation rates across an ageless population ensuring that slower 
population growth reduces GDP growth, but increases per capita income growth.
9  In reality, 
as seen above, in a developing country with large number of dependent children, a fall in 
fertility not only slows population growth, it also reduces the total dependency ratio and 
raises the proportion of the working-aged population.  This effectively boosts the basic 
Solow-Swan impact on income per capita, giving rise to the demographic dividend.
10 
In addition to these supply-side effects of demographic change on growth, changes in 
age distributions also have demand-side implications.  Lower fertility raises the average age 
of the population, changing the scale and product composition of final consumption to more 
strongly reflect the preferences of adults and the aged.  More importantly, the associated rise 
in the proportion of the working-aged population tends to raise the share of households’ 
                                                 
8 See also Sharping (2006) and Tyers, Golley and Bain (2009) for further discussion on this point. 
9 See Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), and the detailed analytical review offered by Pitchford (1974: Ch.4). 
10 This can easily be seen by the simple decomposition of per capita income (Y/N) into per worker income 
(Y/W) times the working-age proportion of the total population (W/N), where Y is total income, N is total 
population, and W is the working-age population.  See Bloom and Canning (2005a) for a clear exposition. 8 
 
disposable incomes devoted to saving.  In a developing country, following a fertility decline, 
this tends to increase the average savings rate.  If investment is also raised, the demographic 
dividend is further bolstered.
11  The more open is the capital account the more investment and 
capital growth depends on the economy’s comparative performance and not, narrowly, on its 
savings behavior.  Thus, as China and India trend toward more open capital accounts, the 
effects of aging via their saving rates are likely to diminish.  Indeed, in affecting growth 
performance, the supply-side effects of demographic change, acting as they do directly 
through the size of the labor force, tend to dominate demand-side changes in average savings 
rates and in the product composition of consumption.
12 
Additional complexities include the link between labor force growth, capital returns, 
and foreign investment.  While attracting investment from abroad boosts GDP growth, the 
new capital returns are repatriated and the contribution to per capita income growth then 
depends on real wage changes.  Faster labor force growth necessarily slows real wage growth 
even while it attracts foreign investment.  The pattern of migration is also dependent on the 
growth path of real wages.  Both China and India are substantial suppliers of (mainly skilled) 
migrants to the rest of the world.  Growth due to boosted fertility, and its slower real wage 
growth path, would raise skilled emigration and reduce skill endowments in both.  Finally, 
any labor supply-driven acceleration of GDP growth tends to shift the terms of trade 
adversely by raising output relative to consumption and exports relative to imports (or, 
equivalently, lower wage costs relative to other regions tend to cause real depreciation).  This 
also tends to weigh down the growth of per capita income.  The integrated model of 
demographic change and economic growth presented in the next section activates most of 
these interactions and it offers scope to experiment with alternative assumptions about each. 
As if that wasn’t enough, further complexities arise when the interdependence of 
fertility, longevity, labor force participation, and savings rates are fully accounted for.  In one 
theoretical study, Bloom and Canning (2005b) predict that improvements in health and 
longevity will result in rising natural retirement ages (increased aged labor force 
participation) but declining average savings rates, the latter occurring because longer working 
lives reduce the need to save for retirement in each successive age cohort.  Much more 
complicated is the impact of alternative pension systems on retirement decisions and savings, 
                                                 
11  There is a large literature concerning the relationship between demography and savings, including Higgins 
(1998), Higgins and Williamson (1997), Chamon and Prasad (2008), Kuijs (2006), Modigliani and Cao (2004), 
Horioka and Wan (2007), Horioka (2010a,b) and Kinugasa and Mason (2005). We acknowledge that we do not 
do justice to this topic in this paper. 
12 See Tyers and Shi (2007) for a demonstration of this point. 9 
 
since different measures to deal with pension-related budgetary pressures will have 
profoundly different effects.
13  Furthermore, there is the potential for declining fertility rates 
to increase labour force participation, particularly among women, as demonstrated by Bloom 
et al. (2007) for 97 countries over the period 1960-2000, in which they show that higher 
female participation rates following fertility decline generate per capita income gains of 21 
per cent. 
 
4. Modeling the Demographic Dividend  
The approach adopted follows Tyers and Shi (2007), in that a complete demographic sub-
model is integrated within a dynamic numerical model of the global economy.
14  The baseline 
scenario represents a “business as usual” projection of global demographic change and 
economic growth through to 2030.  Although policy analysis can be sensitive to the content 
of this scenario, our focus in subsequent sections is the extent of departures associated with 
alternative assumptions about demographic change in China and India.  Nonetheless, it is 
instructive to describe the baseline because all scenarios have a common set of assumptions 
about future trends in key exogenous variables and because some exposition of the baseline 
makes the construction of departures from it clearer.  Moreover, it is convenient to use the 
model to estimate the size of the demographic dividends that could be enjoyed by both 
economies during the first three decades of this century. 
 
Demographic change 
Each region represented in the model includes four age groups, two genders, and two 
skill categories, for a total of 16 population groups in each of 18 regions, two of which are 
Mainland China and India.  The four age groups are the dependent young, adults of fertile 
and working age, older working adults, and the mostly retired over 60s.  The skill subdivision 
is between households that provide production labor (unskilled) and those that provide 
professional labor (skilled).
15  Each age-gender-skill group is a homogeneous subpopulation 
                                                 
13 Heller’s (2006) recent review of Asian countries’ preparedness for future population aging suggests that both 
China and India lag behind the more advanced but smaller Asian economies in the development of policy 
regimes to cover pensions, health insurance, and labor market change. 
14 The economic model is a development of GTAP-Dynamic, the standard version of which has single 
households in each region and therefore no demographic structure.  It, in turn, is a development of its 
comparative static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel 1997).  Its dynamics are described by Ianchovichina and Walmsley 
(2010). 
15 The subdivision between production and professional labor accords with ILO’s occupation-based 
classification and is consistent with the labor division adopted in the GTAP Database. Mothers in families 
providing production labor are assumed to produce children who will grow up to also provide production labor, 10 
 
with group-specific birth and death rates and rates of both immigration and emigration.  If the 
group spans T years, the survival rate to the next age group is the fraction 1/T of its 
population, after group-specific deaths have been removed and its population has been 
adjusted for net migration. 
The final age group (60+) has duration equal to measured life expectancy at 60, which 
varies across genders and regions.  So the key demographic parameters are birth rates, sex 
ratios at birth, age-gender specific death, immigration and emigration rates, and life 
expectancies at 60.
16  The birth rates, life expectancy at 60, and age-specific death rates all 
trend through time asymptotically, approaching a target at a rate of growth determined by 
historical observation.  Of most interest here are the birth rates, which, along with the 
corresponding total fertility rates (TFR), are listed in Table 1 for China and India.  China’s 
baseline TFR is exogenously projected to fall from 1.91 in 1997 to reach 1.44 by 2030, 
slightly higher than the United Nation’s (2008) “low” fertility projection of 1.35.  For India, 
the base year TFR of 3.47 trends asymptotically to a target of 2.56, slightly higher than the 
United Nation’s (2008) “high” fertility projection of 2.5 for India. 
A further key parameter is the rate at which each region’s education and social 
development institutions transform production worker families into professional worker 
families.  Each year a particular proportion of the population in each production worker age-
gender group is transferred to professional (skilled) status.  These proportions depend on the 
regions’ levels of development, the associated capacities of their education systems, and the 
relative sizes of the production and professional labor groups.  The resulting initial rates of 
transformation are based on changes during the decade prior to the base year, 1997, in the 
composition of aggregate regional labor forces as between production and professional 
workers.  They change through time in response to changes in skilled wage premia, skilled 
shares of labor forces and real per capita income (Tyers and Bain 2006). 
 
Measuring dependency and the demographic dividend 
The definition of a population’s total dependency ratio and its components is essential 
to projections of its demographic dividend.  We consider the number of full-time equivalent 
workers, rather than the working-age population, to be the most appropriate measure of the 
labor force on which these ratios are based.  The total dependency ratio is then the ratio of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
while the children of mothers in professional families are correspondingly assumed to become professional 
workers 
16 See Tyers and Bain (2006) for further details about the global migration flows in this model. 11 
 
number of people not participating in labor markets to the number of full time equivalent 
workers.  We will refer to the inverse of this ratio, the number of full-time equivalent workers 
relative to the number of people not working, as the dividend ratio.  Before formalizing this, 
however, we need to define dependency more precisely, which requires a detailed definition 
of the labor force. 
To evaluate the number of full-time equivalent workers, we first construct labour 
force participation rates, Pa,g,r by age group, a, gender, g and region, r, from ILO statistics on 
the economically-active population.  We then investigate the proportion of workers that are 
part time and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for full-time work.  The 
result is the number of full-time equivalent workers, Fa,g,r.  The full-time equivalent labour 
force in region r and year t, 
t
r L , then depends on the corresponding regional populations, 
,,,
t
agsr N , which are divided between age and gender groups but also according to the skill 
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tt t t
agsr ar agr agr agsr LP F N    . 
Here  ,
t
ar   is a shift parameter reflecting the influence of policy on participation rates.  The 
time superscript on  ,,
t
agr P  refers to the extrapolation of observed trends in these parameters.  
For each age-gender group and region, a target country is identified whose specific 
participation rates are approached asymptotically.  The rate of this approach is determined by 
the observed rate of change in participation during the late 1990s.  Target rates are chosen 
from countries considered “advanced” in terms of trends in labor force participation.  Where 
female participation rates are rising, Norway provides a commonly chosen target because its 
female labour force participation rates are higher than for other countries.  For each age-
gender group, full-time equivalency then depends on the fraction of participants working full 
time, fa,g,r, and, for those working part time, the ratio of average part time hours to full time 
hours for that gender group and region, rg,r.  For each group, the ratio of full time equivalent 
workers to total labour force participants is then    ,, ,, ,, , 1 agr agr agr gr Ff f r   .
17 
For China and India, the trends in labor force participation rates are summarised in 
Table 2.  China’s aged labor force participation is assumed to rise slightly to allow for the 
                                                 
17  Values for fa,g,r and rg,r are approximated from OECD statistics.   No data on part time work in non-OECD 
member countries is readily available and, for India and China, its incidence is likely to be comparatively low.  
The detailed numbers used are listed by Chan and Tyers (2006: Tables 11 and 12).   12 
 
expected shortfall in pension income as more retirees leave private sector employment.  India 
has substantially higher aged participation rates, lacking China’s central planning history.  
The other striking pattern is that India’s female labor force participation rates are 
considerably lower in the main working age group (ages 15–59) than those in China.  This 
reduces India’s recorded labor force relative to that of China’s (seen further below).
18 
Returning to dependency, we identify three component dependency ratios based on 
the age-gender groups in the model.  The first is the youth dependency ratio, defined as the 
number of dependent children per full time equivalent worker: 













where  015, ,
t
gr N  is the number in the 0-15 age group, and 
t
r L  is the full-time equivalent labor 
force from (1), above.  The second is the aged dependency ratio, in which the numerator 
comprises only the non-working population over 60.  Note that this can be very different from 
the more conventional aged dependency ratio depending on aged labor force participation: 
(3) 

















The third is the working-aged dependency ratio, in which the numerator comprises the 





















The sum of these three dependency ratios indicates the number of non-working people 
of all ages and genders per full-time equivalent worker, and gives our total dependency ratio.  
























                                                 
18 Populations and labor forces are disaggregated by skill in the modeling.  These splits have little impact on 
dependency in general and so are averaged out in the table. 13 
 
Projections of these dependency and dividend ratios are listed in Table 3.  Notably, 
one of the largest dependent groups comprises those of working age who are not participating 
in the labor market.  This is due, in part, to education participation by those over 15, in part to 
disablement and in part to home-making partners.  The simulated changes to 2030 show the 
expected declines in youth dependency as fertility declines, with a more dramatic drop for 
India. The associated aging boosts aged dependency, with the non-working aged dependency 
ratio close to doubling in both countries, albeit from a lower base in India.  Declines in youth 
dependency more than offset rises in aged dependency in both regions but the difference is 
larger for India.  Inverting the total dependency ratios yields dividend ratios that are higher 
for China (more workers per dependent) but rising much faster for India. 
This raises one of the key points of this paper.  According to the commonly used 
measures of dependency (based on United Nation’s projections of age structures), China’s 
total dependency ratio is predicted to increase, i.e., its dividend ratio to decline, beyond 2010, 
as shown in Figure 3.  And yet, when the true number of “dependents” is taken into account, 
as in Table 3, we see that in fact China’s dependency ratio is actually lower (and its dividend 
ratio is higher) in 2030 than it was in 2000.  Rising aged dependency is thus projected to take 
considerable time to overtake the effects of declining youth dependency and this process is 
projected to be incomplete by 2030. 
 
Economic growth 
The model of the global economy that embodies the demographic behavior discussed 
previously considers each region to contribute seven industries: agriculture, light 
manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, metals, energy, minerals and services.  To reflect 
compositional differences between regions, these products are differentiated by region of 
origin, meaning that the “light manufactures” produced in one region are not the same as 
those produced in others.  Consumers substitute imperfectly between manufactures from 
different regions.   
To capture the full effects of demographic change, the multiple age, gender, and skill 
groups are modeled as separate households.  These 16 groups differ in their shares of regional 
disposable incomes, consumption preferences, savings rates, and their labor supply behavior.  
While the consumption-savings choice differs for each age-gender group, it is dependent for 14 
 
all on current group-specific real per capita disposable income and the real lending rate.  
Governments balance their budgets while private groups save or borrow.
19   
As in other dynamic models of the global economy, the main endogenous driver of 
simulated economic growth is physical capital accumulation.  The transformation of workers 
from unskilled to skilled is another driving force in this model, with transformation rates 
differing by age and gender and depending on the real skilled wage premium.  In addition, 
technical change is introduced in the form of exogenous productivity growth that is sector 
and factor specific.  It has the Solow-Swan property, shared with all neoclassical dynamic 
models that embody diminishing returns to factor use, that an increase in the growth rate of 
the population raises the growth rate of real GDP but reduces the level of real per capita 
income (hence reflecting a “population pessimistic” view of the world).  What distinguishes 
the model from its simpler progenitors is the endogeneity of saving rates and its multiregional 
structure.  All regional capital accounts are open and investors have adaptive expectations 
about real regional net rates of return on installed capital.  These drive the distribution of 
investment across regions.  In each, the level of investment is determined by a comparison of 
net rates of return on domestic installed capital with borrowing rates yielded by a global trust, 
to which each region’s saving contributes, adjusted by calibrated region-specific interest 
premia. 
Consumption-savings preferences are represented by age-gender-skill specific 
consumption equations that relate real per capita consumption to real per capita income and 
the real lending rate in each region.  There is no endogeneity of saving rates to life 
expectancy at 60 even though death rates decline through time and life expectancy increases 
in both nations.
20  Group saving rates change in response to changes in income and interest 
rates but, more importantly, regional average saving rates respond to changes in age and skill 
distributions.  As a young population ages, the proportion of its population in the saving age 
groups rises and so does its average saving rate.  In the case of an old population, further 
aging raises the proportion of non-working aged, and so its average saving rate falls.  The 
Chinese 60+ age group is unusual, at least through the 1990s, in that it has low labor force 
participation but high state-financed retirement incomes.  The pensions, combined with low 
consumption expenditures due to extended family sharing, lead to high initial retiree saving 
                                                 
19 Unlike the standard GTAP models, in which regional incomes are split between private consumption, 
government consumption, and total saving via an upper-level Cobb-Douglas utility function that implies fixed 
regional saving rates, this adaptation first divides regional incomes between government consumption and total 
private disposable income and then allows endogeneity of group saving rates depending on real disposable 
income levels and real interest rates. 
20 This endogeneity is suggested by Bloom and Canning (2005b). 15 
 
rates.  Yet because the proportion of the aged retiring on relatively generous state pensions is 
declining, the 60+ groups are assumed to have underlying savings rates that fall through time.  
In the case of India, we have no a priori reason to think that the underlying saving rates will 
rise or fall, and so these are held constant. 
 
Baseline projections for China and India 
The baseline population and labor force projections for both China and India are 
illustrated in Figure 4 and the associated changes in the age and gender structure of each are 
summarized in Table 4.
21  A dramatic contrast between the projections for China and India is 
clear from Figure 4.  While China’s labor force falls short of a 10 per cent increase over the 
three decades, and declines after 2015, the Indian labor force grows strongly, with expansion 
continuing beyond 2030.  This contrast is primarily due to the relative youth of India’s 
population and its higher initial fertility rate.  Even though the two populations are projected 
to reach rough parity in 2030, the Indian labor force remains smaller, due mainly to lower 
female participation rates.  Accordingly, the projected Indian labor force has proportionally 
more male workers.  Interestingly, the more rapid aging of China’s population 
notwithstanding, the projected labor forces of the two nations maintain very similar 
proportions of older workers.  This is explained by India’s comparatively high participation 
rates of 60+ workers, which are close to double China’s for both men and women. 
Figure 4 reveals another critical point.  The key phase of the demographic dividend 
can be thought of as the period over which the trend of the labor force exceeds that of the 
total population, relative to their values in the base year.  Despite the fact that China’s labor 
force actually declines beyond 2015, its trend relative to the base year remains above that of 
the total population.  Accordingly, its dependency ratio remains below (and its dividend ratio 
above) that in the base year.  Hence its demographic dividend post 2000, as measured in 
terms of the resulting increment to per capita real income, might be expected to extend 
through 2030. 
Overall baseline economic performance is suggested by Figure 5.  In it we include the 
performances of the US and Western Europe, to illustrate the relatively strong growth 
anticipated in China and India and also to show the consequences of our representation of the 
                                                 
21 There are several sets of exogenous baseline shocks the baseline and all other simulations have in common: 1) 
exogenous technical change, which is specific to primary factors and industries, 2) time-varying risk premia 
ensure that all new investment is not directed merely to the most populous regions which would otherwise have 
the highest marginal products of capital, and 3) idiosyncratic shocks to risk premia and investment productivity 
are introduced to represent the global financial crisis, the principal effects of which are felt in 2008 but the 
recovery from which in the US and Western Europe is assumed to take five years (Tyers and Bain 2008). 16 
 
global financial crisis in the baseline projection.  In part because of underlying assumptions 
about continued productivity growth in China, its GDP and its GNP per capita are projected 
to grow the most rapidly, with India a little behind.  China’s lead in per capita terms is 
sustained because of its superior net foreign income in the later years, which stems from its 
extraordinarily high saving rate and foreign asset accumulation in the interim, and because its 
population is then contracting while India’s continues to expand. 
 
China’s and India’s demographic dividends, 2000-2030 
In order to isolate the pure effects of changes in age distributions – that is, the demographic 
dividend – a variant of the model is constructed in which the endogenous demographic 
behavior is switched off from the year 2000 and the total populations are constrained to grow 
through time at the same rates as in the baseline projection, so that age distributions are held 
fixed through time.  The resulting simulation therefore picks up the Solow-Swan effects of 
slowing population growth, which serve to raise real per capita income, but not the effects of 
changes in age distributions.  We take this simulation as a comparator and consider the 
baseline, with its full demography, as a departure from it in which all shocks and behavior are 
the same except that age distributions change through time.  In one simulation we do this 
only for China and in the other we do it only for India, in each case regarding the base line 
with full demography as a departure and recording the differences. 
In both cases the aging that occurs after 2000 and through to 2030  raises the 
proportion of the population engaged in work and so raises real per capita income.  As shown 
in Figure 6, however, the sizes of these demographic dividends are very different.  India starts 
the new millennium with considerably more youth dependency than China and so aging 
moves this youthful abundance into working age and so reduces overall dependency.  The 
result is a gain of a little over five per cent in real per capita income over the three decades.  
China, too, has mostly youth dependency but, by 2000, there is much less than in India and so 
aging is less beneficial, delivering a demographic dividend of about one per cent in real per 
capita income through to 2030.  Indeed, as we see in the section to follow, in the life of this 
simulation aged dependency rises and, beyond 2030, would become the dominant form of 
dependency in China. 
The fact that China continues to receive a positive demographic dividend through to 
2030, albeit a small one, contrasts with recent claims that the end of its demographic 
transition, and hence its demographic dividend, is imminent.  The path for China in Figure 6 
indicates that, when we take explicit account in our analysis of the working aged and the non-17 
 
working of working age, per capita income gains due to declines in youth dependency are not 
wiped out by rises in aged dependency until after 2030, leaving real per capita income larger 
by a per cent or so in each year than it would have been had no changes in age distribution 
occurred after 2000. 
 
5. Alternative Fertility Policies 
To illustrate the impact of different fertility assumptions, we consider two alternative 
scenarios.  The first is for China’s fertility rate to be higher than assumed in the baseline, as 
would presumably be the case if a two-child policy was implemented and responded to.
22  
The second is for India’s fertility to decline faster than the baseline assumption. The effect of 
each is described in turn and, for the economic bottom line, a set of elasticities is constructed 
that enables the two scenarios to be compared. 
 
A two-child policy for China 
A higher-fertility scenario is constructed that, unlike the baseline, which has declining 
Chinese fertility, is closer to the State Council’s (2000) “two-child policy” and to Sharping’s 
(2000) “delayed two-child policy”.  In particular, in China we assume that the total fertility 
rate for low-skill families rises over the three decades from 1.8. to 2.6 and, for high skill 
families from 1.3 to 1.8.  The 2030 values compare with 1.6 and 1.2, respectively, in the 
baseline.  This change raises the 2030 population by 19 per cent relative to the baseline.  The 
implications for population and labor force growth are displayed graphically in Figure 7.  
Critically, the path of China’s labor force shifts up by substantially less than that of its 
population.  By 2030, the labor force is larger by 13 per cent and the population by 21 per 
cent.  This is because higher fertility first enlarges the youth population, which does not 
contribute to the labor force but rather raises dependency.  China’s population continues to 
age, however, although more slowly with the higher fertility rate.  This can be seen from the 
non-working-aged dependency ratio in Figure 8.  After 2015 there are discernable 
differences, with the two-child policy yielding a 2030 ratio that is lower by four percentage 
points than the low-fertility baseline.  As the figure shows clearly, however, rising youth 
dependency dominates declining aged dependency, ensuring that the total dependency rate is 
higher throughout the period. 
                                                 
22 As noted above, this response is not guaranteed.  Zhang (2007), for example, provides evidence of families in 
rural China shifting from “active resistance against” to “conscious decision for” the one-child limit.  However, a 
recent survey showed that 78 per cent of Chinese people would have two children if allowed (The China Daily 
(2010b). 18 
 
The economic effects reflect many, although not all, of the points made in Section 3.  
In particular, supply-side labor force effects are dominant.  The anticipated supply-side story 
is that the labor force expands, increasing capital productivity, and therefore the return on 
Chinese investment.  This attracts more of the world’s savings into China so that its capital 
stock grows more rapidly.  China’s GDP might therefore be expected to be boosted 
substantially by increased fertility, through its direct and indirect influence over the supply of 
the two main factors of production, labor and capital.
23  In per capita terms, however, three 
forces would conspire to ensure that the average Chinese person bears an economic cost.  
First, the Solow-Swan predisposition (due to diminishing marginal returns) toward slower 
real wage growth would tend to slow the growth of income per capita.  Second, the associated 
shift in the age distribution would cause a rise in dependency (or a fall in the dividend ratio, 
as shown in Figure 9) and hence a further slowing of per capita income growth. Finally, 
because much of the new capital stems from foreign investment, there is a need to reward its 
foreign owners resulting in a further loss of national income. 
The magnitudes of these changes for key variables are indicated in Table 5.  The labor 
force increase is associated with lower growth paths for both skilled and unskilled wages.
24  
The rate of return on installed capital in China is raised and so, therefore, is the level of 
investment and the growth in the physical capital stock.  Yet because the original stimulus is 
labor force expansion, this is insufficient to prevent a decline in labor productivity and hence 
in real wages.  The terms of trade deteriorate slightly due to expansion in China’s exports and 
its greater market power on the export than the import side.  In the end, China’s 2030 GDP is 
higher by 5.8 per cent compared with the baseline.  And the rise in dependency, the 
slowdown in real wage growth, the repatriation abroad of an increased proportion of the 
income accruing to capital, the small addition to skilled emigration, and the terms-of-trade 
deterioration all conspire to slow the rate of growth in real per capita income.  By 2030 it is 
smaller than the baseline by 8.1 per cent.  This represents a significant cost of “pushing the 
fertility button” to achieve higher GDP growth.
25 
                                                 
23 This result could have a number of economic implications that are not captured in our model, including that 
higher fertility might reduce pressure on fiscal policy and so the growth-retarding effects of tax distortions 
might be reduced. Our scenarios maintain constant tax rates and fiscal deficits. 
24This has some effect on migration, but the effect is too small to give more space here. More details about the 
migration behavior embodied in the model are provided by Tyers and Bain (2006).  
25 Empirical evidence for such terms-of-trade effects from growth is variable. In many cases, developing country 
expansions have not caused adverse shifts in their terms of trade because their trade has embraced new products 
and quality ladders in ways not captured by our model. See the literature on the developing country exports 
fallacy of composition argument, including Lewis (1952), Grilli and Yang (1988), Martin (1993), Singer (1998), 
and Mayer (2003). 19 
 
 
Lower fertility in India 
The low fertility scenario for India embodies a fall in the total fertility rate to 1.55 by 
2030, compared with 2.55 in the baseline simulation, thus reducing fertility by one child per 
woman.
26 The simulation is therefore similar to Dyson’s (2002) “low fertility” variant. As 
shown in Figure 7, it offers substantial slowdowns in both the population and the labor force, 
with both tending to stabilize by around 2030. As in the fertility shock to China, the effect on 
the labor force is proportionally smaller than that on the population. Again, this is because 
fertility changes first affect the youth population, and not those of working age. In contrast 
with China, however, in India the difference is made larger by its young population, its large 
population of women of fertile age, and its high, aged labor-force participation rates. The 
diminished slowing impact on the labor force results in a substantial decline in the total 
dependency ratio (and therefore a substantial rise in the dividend ratio), which is the 
combination of a minimal rise in non-working-aged dependency combined with a dramatic 
decline in youth dependency, as shown in Figures 8 and 9. 
The economic implications of this are indicated in Table 5. Slower labor force growth 
yields slower capital productivity growth and therefore slower investment and capital 
accumulation. With slower primary factor accumulation comes slower GDP growth—real 
GDP reaches a 2030 level that is 7.9 per cent lower than the baseline. By contrast with 
China’s fertility increase, the forces influencing real per capita income are all positive, which 
amplifies the Solow-Swan predisposition toward inverse proportionality between the growth 
rates of population and per capita income. Even though aged dependency rises slightly, 
overall dependency falls substantially and slower population growth makes the average 
Indian better off. By 2030, the cost in GDP is 7.9 per cent relative to the baseline but the gain 
in real per capita income is 15.2 per cent. 
 
Comparing the Implications of Fertility Change in China and India 
Figure 10 reveals that, by 2030, the real per capita income cost to China of increasing 
its fertility rate is roughly equal to the benefits to aggregate GDP, in percentage terms. In 
India, by contrast, real per capita income gains come at the expense of much less GDP. To 
clarify this asymmetry, we extract the elasticities of GDP and per capita income to the target 
                                                 
26 These are averages over the “skilled” and “production worker” populations the shocks to the target levels of 
fertility in each being proportionally the same and sufficient to yield and average change of one child per 
woman. 20 
 
fertility rate—that rate toward which fertility is assumed to trend asymptotically.
27 This 
yields unitless measures that are independent of the directions of the fertility shocks. As 
shown in Figure 11, these elasticities change through time because, following a shock to the 
target fertility rate, the economic implications enlarge with departures from the baseline 
population and labor force. While the effects of fertility change on GDP are found to be fairly 
similar for the two countries, the benefit in per capita terms of reducing fertility in India is 
more than twice as large is in China. This stems primarily from India’s comparatively young 




Within the next decade, China’s labor force will begin to contract, while that of India will 
expand faster than its population.  A straightforward consideration of this in a neoclassical 
model with diminishing factor returns leads to the expectation that the impact of these 
changes will be lower GDP and higher per capita income growth in China, and the reverse in 
India, and this general pattern does emerge from the analysis provided above.  However, the 
story is considerably more complex than this.  In particular, population structure plays a 
critical role in determining the relative magnitudes of labor force growth to total population 
growth and the consequent change in dependency ratios, which in turn impact significantly 
on per capita income growth.  Moreover, real wage trends influence skilled emigration from 
these regions and therefore the skill composition of their labor forces.  With increasingly 
open capital accounts, other things equal, both countries stand to attract more foreign 
investment the faster their labor forces grow.  This complements the positive association 
between fertility and GDP but the necessity to compensate foreign capital owners detracts 
from the per capita income result.  Finally, faster GDP growth tends to shift the terms of trade 
adversely, which also detracts from per capita performance.  Our integrated model of global 
demography and economic growth offers some insight into all of these complexities. 
Given their very different population age structures, the differences in timing and 
magnitude of China’s and India’s demographic dividends comes as no surprise:  China’s 
largely lies in the past while India’s lies in the present.  However, the use of the working 
population, rather than the working-age population, to measure dependency reveals that 
China’s dividend (due to age distribution changes from 2000) is projected to be positive 
                                                 
27 Virtually the same result emerges when the contemporaneous fertility rate is used. 21 
 
through 2030.  More critically, this “true” dependency ratio reflects the actual benefits from 
having a rising share of workers in the population, rather than the potential benefits of having 
a rising share of the merely working aged.  Our findings do not refute the empirical stream of 
work that highlights the significance of the demographic dividend as a key determinant of 
economic growth. Rather they reinforce it, since age distribution effects are larger, 
particularly in China’s case, when actual participation rates are properly accounted for.   
A relaxation of the one-child policy has been proposed by some as a way of 
combating the negative impact that the slowdown and aging of China’s population will have 
on GDP growth in the future.  Our simulations indicate that this would indeed achieve the 
twin goals of increasing GDP and reducing the proportion of the aged population. They also 
imply, however, that per capita income by 2030 would be reduced by almost as much as GDP 
would rise. If higher fertility rates are considered desirable for China to achieve its GDP 
growth and other (libertarian) objectives, policy efforts will need to be directed toward 
mitigating the negative impact of higher population growth on per capita income by raising 
labor market participation rates and increasing retirement ages. 
In contrast, India is set to become the world’s most populous country by 2030, and its 
population policy continues to be directed toward promoting fertility decline. While lower 
fertility reduces GDP and increases per capita income in both countries, India gains 
substantially more per capita income than China per unit change in fertility, a result that 
depends critically on India’s higher youth dependency.  India therefore has considerably 
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Figure 1: Crude birth and death rates, China and India, 1950-2010 
 
Source: United Nations (2008).  Crude birth and death rates are number of births and deaths over a given period 
divided by the person-years lived by the population over that period. They are expressed as number of 
birth/deaths per 1000 population. 
 
Figure 2: Youth and aged to working-aged population ratios, China and India, 1950-




Source: United Nations (2008), populations projections based on medium fertility variant.  Youth dependency 
ratio is number of youth (0-14 years) divided number of working-aged (15-59 years) in the total population.  
Aged dependency is number of aged (60+) divided number of working-aged (15-59 years) in the total 
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Figure 3: Working-age to non-working aged ratio, China and India, 1950-2030 
 
 
Source: United Nations (2008), populations projections based on medium fertility variant.  Ratio is the working-
age (15-59 years) population divided by the non-working age (0-14 years and 60+ years).     
 
 
Figure 4: Projected Populations and Labor Forces, People’s Republic of China and 
India
a 
  People’s  Republic  of  China     India 
 
 
a These are cumulative % departures from the base year 1997, drawn from the baseline simulation in which 
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 Figure 5: Baseline Real GNP Per Capita Growth Rates 
a, % a year 
 
a These are baseline annual growth rates of simulated real GNP per capita and so include net 
foreign income, which is substantial for China. They diverge in the later years for this reason 
and because China’s population declines while India’s continues to rise. 
 
Figure 6: Baseline Demographic Dividends 2000 to 2030
a 
(% increase in real per capita income due to age distribution change) 
 
 
a For the case of China, this compares a simulation under baseline conditions 
that retains a constant age distribution, but all population groups following the 
baseline total population growth path, with the full baseline in which all age 
distributions are fully endogenous.  A separate but corresponding “constant 





























Figure 7: Population and Labor Force: Alternative Scenarios 
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        China: Two-Child Policy              India: Lower fertility 
 
            




























Lower fertility labour force29 
 
 
Figure 8: Projected Total, Youth, and Non-Working-Aged (60+) Dependency Ratios 
a 
 
    China: 2 Baseline and Two-Child Policy      India: Baseline and Lower fertility 
  
a These are the simulated ratios of the total population, the total youth population (0–15), and the non-working-aged population, to the full-time 





























Alternative fertility: non-working aged30 
 




a These are simply the inverses of the total dependency ratios in Figure 8.  They 
measure the number of workers for each dependent. 
 
 
Figure 10: GDP, Real Wages and Real per Capita Income 
Alternative Scenarios (% Departures from the Baseline)
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    China: Two-Child Policy      India: Lower fertility 
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a These are the percentage changes in real GDP and real per capita income for each corresponding percentage 
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Table 1: Birth and Total Fertility Rates in China and India 
 China  India 
 Baseline   
 Birth  rate
a  TFR
b  Birth rate
  TFR
 
Base year, 1997  76  1.91 139 3.47 
                  2010  62  1.56 114 2.86 
                  2020  59  1.47 106 2.65 
                  2030  58  1.44 102 2.56 
a Birth rates are here defined as the number of births per year per thousand women 
of fertile age.  They are modified to allow for the modeling simplification that the 
fertile age group spans 15-39. 
b Total fertility rates (TFR) are the average number of children borne by a woman 
throughout her life. 
Source:  Aggregated from United Nations (2003), US Department of Commerce- 





Table 2: Age-Gender Specific Participation Rates in China and India, 
Base Year (1997) and Projected, 2030
a 
Full-time equivalent workers per person PRC India 
Males Females Males  Females
     15-39       
          Initial (1997)  0.79 0.60  0.81 0.35 
          2030  0.77 0.61  0.83 0.36 
     40-59       
          Initial (1997)  0.91 0.43  0.95 0.38 
          2030  0.93 0.45  0.96 0.40 
     60+       
          Initial (1997)  0.24 0.04  0.55 0.14 
          2030  0.27 0.08  0.55 0.15 
a Projections of these parameters to 2020 assume convergence on target rates observed in comparatively 
“advanced” countries.  Only the end point values are shown here but the model uses values that change 
with time along the path to convergence.  Note, also that these are averages over the skilled and unskilled 
categories.  In the case of China participation by skilled (educated) women is much higher than for 
unskilled, particularly for 40+, contributing an extra per cent to the 2030 average. 
Source:  Values to 1997 are from United Nations (2000).  For splits by skill level see Tyers and Bain 
(2006). 
 
    33
 
 
Table 3.  Dependency and Dividend Ratios (%)
a 
   China  India 
Youth / working  Initial 59.0 93.3 
  2030 38.5 61.6 
Non-working aged / working  Initial 17.5 12.1 
  2030 38.1 23.9 
Non-working of working age / working Initial 45.0 62.7 
  2030 40.4 53.6 
Total dependency ratio: non-working / working Initial 121.5 168.1 
  2030 117.0 139.1 
Dividend ratio: inverse of total dependency Initial 82.3 59.5 
  2030 85.5 71.9 
a The dependency ratios may be read as the number of dependents per 100 full time equivalent workers, while the 
dividend ratios give the number of full time equivalent workers per dependent.  The declines in non-working of 
working age dependency are due primarily to aging of the female labor force, though female skilling contributes in the 
case of China. 
Source: The base period ratios are constructed from population statistics from United Nations (2005) and those for 2030 





Table 4: Baseline Population and Labor Force Structure in China and India 
  China India 
Population  Millions  % 
Female
% 60+ Millions % 
Female 
% 60+
Initial (1997)  1272 48.5 9.7  955  48.2  6.9 
2010  1364 48.7 14.8 1146 48.4 10.6 
2020  1375 48.8 18.4 1263 48.5 13.0 
2030  1353 49.0 21.2 1349 48.5 14.8 
         
Labor Force     % 40+    % 40+
Initial (1997)  570 37.2  33.9 356 27.4  36.3 
2010  618 36.7  41.2 459 27.1  41.7 
2020  624 36.4  45.4 522 27.2  45.1 
2030  613 36.1  48.2 568 27.5  47.9 
Source: Projection using the baseline simulation of the model described in the text.  The labor forces are 
measured in full-time equivalent workers. 
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Table 5: Economic Effects of Alternative Fertility Scenarios 



















China: Two-Child Policy - % Departures from the baseline 
 
2010  1.5 1.1 -0.1  -0.5  -0.0 0.3 -2.3 
2020  3.0 6.5 -0.7  -1.9  -0.4 1.9 -4.9 
2030  3.6 13.6 -2.6  -4.5  -1.2  5.8  -8.1 
 
 
India: Low Fertility Projections - % Departures from the baseline 
 
2010  -0.3 -1.7 0.7  1.3  0.1  -2.2  4.8 
2020  -2.0 -6.3 2.2  4.2  0.9  -3.5 10.4 
2030  -5.2 -12.7 4.8  8.6  2.5  -7.9  15.3 
Source: The baseline, China 2-Child Policy and India Low Fertility projections from the model described 
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